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We compare wages in multinational enterprises (MNEs) versus domestic firms, the earnings 
of domestic firm workers with past, future and no MNE experience, and estimate how the 
presence of ex-MNE peers affects the earnings of domestic firm employees. The analysis 
relies on monthly panel data covering half of the Hungarian population and their employers 
in 2003–2011. We identify the returns to MNE experience from changes of ownership, 
wages paid by new firms of different ownership, and the movement of workers between 
enterprises. We find high contemporaneous and lagged returns to MNE experience and 
significant spillover effects. Foreign acquisition has a moderate wage impact but there 
is a wide gap between new MNEs and domestic firms. The findings suggest that MNE 
experience is valued in the high-wage segment of the local economy, connected with the 
MNEs via worker turnover.
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We study the direct and indirect wage effects of work experience in multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) using monthly panel data from Hungary, 2003–2011. The wage premium of MNE workers 
over similar domestic-sector employees in similar firms is an indisputable gain for the society, 
especially if it is portable and exerts positive spillover effects. While corporate revenues can easily 
find their way back home via profit repatriation and transfer pricing, and many MNEs are 
provided with an initial tax holiday, the wage surplus generated by foreign direct investment 
predominantly remains and is spent in the host country. 
Our benchmark models follow a route paved by Aitken and Harrison (1999), Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2004), Barry et al. (2005) and especially Balsvik (2011) and Poole (2013), who used linked 
employer–employee data similar to ours to study wage spillovers in Norway and Brazil, 
respectively. We first estimate the foreign-domestic wage gap using a model with both worker 
and firm fixed effects (2FE henceforth). We then compare domestic firm employees with recent 
experience in MNEs versus domestic enterprises (other than their current employers) controlling 
inter alia for attributes of the sending and receiving firms and jobs. Finally, we estimate spillover 
effects for incumbent domestic firm employees, controlling for observed and unobserved worker 
and firm characteristics. The detailed analysis relates to workers employed in high-skill jobs at 
least once during their observed careers. We briefly discuss some results on less-skilled workers. 
We go beyond replicating the results of Balsvik and Poole by confronting the benchmark models 
with several points of admittedly justified criticism. The first problem is that the 2FE models 
identify the foreign-domestic wage gap from observations on a minuscule and non-randomly 
selected minority of firms undergoing foreign or domestic acquisition. In our sample, 5.3 percent 
of the observed firms changed majority owner during the period of observation. These companies 
paid significantly higher wages than “always domestic” firms (when they were domestic) and 
significantly lower wages than “always foreign” companies (when they were foreign-owned): this 
is how the 2FE model arrives at a close-to-zero estimate of the ownership-specific wage gap. To 
learn about the sources of a much wider gap between incumbent firms, we utilize information on 
newly established and subsequently incumbent MNEs and domestic enterprises.  
Second, improvements in model quality also come at the cost of distortions in the sample and a 
significant loss of observations when we estimate the wage advantage of ex-MNE employees in 
domestic firms. Only about 7 percent of the person-months in our data make it to the estimation 
sample of a model in which work histories and characteristics of the sending and receiving firms 
are adequately controlled. We experiment with a less demanding “overlapping cohorts” model, 
which treats the current earnings of future MNE workers as a counterfactual for post-MNE 
earnings, and makes a similar comparison of workers with past and future outside experience in 
the domestic sector.  
Finally, a selection problem also arises when the study of spillover effects is restricted to 
observations on incumbents—domestic workers with no outside experience at all. In an 
alternative specification, the identification of within-firm spillovers is ensured using a 2FE model.1  
Section 2 briefly discusses previous findings on the paper’s topic, and prewarns the reader of our 
own estimates. Section 3 introduces the data and the local context. Section 4 discusses estimation 
                                                          
1  When we estimate the model for incumbents, the worker fixed effects absorb the unobserved firm characteristics. 
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issues and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 adds supplementary and alternative 
estimations. Section 7 sums up the results and argues that the empirical findings, taken together, 
yield support to a ‘skills diffusion’ scenario in which MNE employees accumulate valuable 
knowledge that spreads in a segment (but not in entirety) of the local economy through the 
channels of worker turnover.  
2. Previous findings on the foreign-domestic wage gap, lagged returns and spillovers 
Estimates of the foreign-domestic wage gap vary in a wide range, with the MNE premium found 
to be nearly negligible in the most developed market economies. In Norway, the OLS estimate by 
Balsvik (2011), controlled for worker and plant characteristics amounts to 3 percent, which falls 
to 0.3 percent once she includes worker fixed effects. An OLS estimate for Sweden by Heyman et 
al. (2007) is even lower at 2 percent. Andrews et al. (2007) and Malchow-Moller et al. (2007) 
detect positive gaps in the range of 1 and 3 percent in Germany and Denmark. The OLS estimate 
of Martins (2004) for Portugal is higher (11 percent), but he finds that the MNE wage premium 
virtually disappears after controlling for worker selection. These figures compare to 32 percent 
(pooled OLS for all skill levels) and 13 percent (after adding worker fixed effects) in our sample. 
Workers moving from domestic to foreign-owned firms are estimated to gain 6 percent in 
Germany and 8 percent in Norway (Andrews et al. 2007, Balsvik 2011) which compares to 53 
percent in the Hungarian sample for all skill levels.2 
 
The foreign-domestic gap is much wider in less developed countries: according to raw data 
presented in Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), in Indonesian manufacturing, the MNE premium 
amounts to 47 percent for blue collars and 55 percent for white collars (41 and 73 percent in 
Hungary). Chen at al. (2017) reports a gap of 40 percent in Chinese manufacturing. An overview 
of data in OECD (2008a), based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey indicates raw gaps of 
between 40 and 50 percent in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and combining all these regions and 
adding Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
A more detailed analysis of the sources of the gaps in Germany, Portugal, the UK and Brazil (OECD 
2008b) finds that the marginal effect of takeovers on wages falls short of 3 percent in all of these 
countries.3 The effects identified using data on worker mobility are more substantial: the 
estimates vary between 6 and 8 percent in Germany and the UK, more than 10 percent in Portugal, 
and 20 percent in Brazil. The authors argue that the discrepancy between the estimates based on 
takeovers versus worker flows are explained by foreign firms’ propensity to share their 
productivity advantage more extensively with new workers than with workers who do not change 
firms. We believe that the difference instead roots in the non-random selection of firms to 
acquisition as will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
To our knowledge, Balsvik's paper is the only one estimating the wage advantage of ex-MNE 
employees in domestic firms. She identifies a premium of 6.9 percent for workers with three or 
more years of tenure in an MNE compared to stayers. However, she also detects an advantage of 
3.3 percent on the part of workers arriving from local firms, suggesting a net benefit from MNE 
experience of 3.6 percent (and smaller advantages in case of shorter completed tenure in the 
                                                          
2 Note that in the Norwegian case, workers moving from MNEs to domestic firms also acquire a gain of 7 percent, while 
in our sample they lose 11 percent. The median loss amounts to 26 percent in the case of skilled workers. See Table 3. 
3 Earle and Telegdy (2008) estimate a 7-percent wage gain from foreign acquisition using Hungarian data for a model 
with firm fixed effects and firm-specific trends.  
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previous job). We find that domestic firm employees, who left an MNE because of mass dismissals, 
closure or relocation earn more than their ex-domestic counterparts by 14 percent, while the 
average difference between the two groups of newcomers amounts to 7 percent. 
 
The empirical evidence on wage and productivity spillovers are mixed. Starting with papers that 
depict a not too rosy picture of how MNEs affect the rest of the economy, Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) identify positive direct effect of foreign ownership on 
productivity in Venezuela and the Czech Republic, but negative spillovers. Results by Konings 
(2001) suggest that the adverse competition effect is stronger than the positive direct productivity 
effect of FDI in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. Barry et al. (2005) found that foreign presence in a 
sector hurt wages and productivity in domestic exporting firms in the same industry (but has no 
effect on wages in domestic non-exporters) in Ireland. Fons-Rosen at al. (2017) concludes that in 
six advanced European countries, positive spillovers are restricted to sectors where domestic 
enterprises are technologically close to MNEs. Suyanto and Bloch (2014) find the opposite in 
Indonesia. Keller and Yeaple (2009) detect significant worker-level wage spillovers only in high-
skill-intensive industries in US manufacturing. 
At the same time, several studies have identified positive spillovers. Using Lithuanian data, 
Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004) detects positive productivity spillovers from MNEs to local suppliers. 
Similarly, Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) find that backward linkages have a positive effect on the 
productivity of domestic firms (while horizontal and forward linkages show no consistent effect) 
in 17 transition countries. Kosová (2010) demonstrates, using Czech data, that crowding out is 
short-term: after an initial shock, domestic firm growth accelerates and survival rates improve. 
Görg and Strobel (2005) show that in Ghana, entrepreneurs with MNE experience start more 
productive small businesses than others.  
One can also find indirect evidence on spillovers, taking into account that MNEs are more 
productive and more likely to export and engage in R&D. Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) show that 
(in Denmark) workers from more productive firms experience productivity gains. Similar results 
are presented for Hungary by Csáfordi et al. (2018). Mion and Opromolla (2013) show that export 
experience implies higher export performance and a sizable wage premium for Portuguese 
managers, who leave for non-exporters. In Finland, Maliranta et al. (2008) identify a positive 
impact of hiring workers with previous R&D experience to non-R&D jobs. 
Importantly, from this paper’s point of view, Poole (2013) estimates that the wages of incumbent 
domestic workers rise by about 0.6 percent if the share of ex-MNE employees increases by 10 
percent, while the effect of outside experience in local firms is about ten times weaker than that. 
While the effect she estimates is not particularly strong, it is statistically significant at 
conventional levels even after controlling for the observed and unobserved attributes of workers 
and firms. 
3. Data 
3.1. Data sources 
Our estimation samples have been drawn from a large longitudinal data set covering a randomly 
chosen 50 percent of Hungary's population aged 5–74 in January 2003. Each person in the sample 
is followed, on a monthly basis, from January 2003 until December 2011 or exit from the registers 
for reasons of death or permanent out-migration. The data collect information from records of the 
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Pension Directorate, the Tax Office, the Health Insurance Fund, the Office of Education and the 
Public Employment Service. We use information on the highest paying job of a given person in a 
given month, days in work and amounts earned in that job. The wage figure comprises all 
payments received during the month in the highest paying job. Throughout the paper, we use daily 
wages (the monthly figure divided by days in work) normalized for the national average in the 
given month. Furthermore, we have data on occupation, type of the employment relationship, 
registration at a labor office, receipt of transfers and several proxies of the person's state of health. 
We do not observe educational attainment—this is approximated with the highest occupational 
status the person achieved in 2003–2011.4 Annual financial data of the employer are available for 
incorporated firms. We regard a firm as MNE if foreigners’ share in subscribed capital exceeds 50 
percent.5  
We restrict the analysis to skilled workers employed with a labor contract at least once in a foreign 
or domestic private enterprise the employment level of which exceeded the ten workers limit at 
least once in 2003–2011. We have several reasons to set a size limit. First, foreign firms are nearly 
absent in the small firm sector.6 Second, financial data are not available for sole proprietorships 
and unincorporated small businesses. Third, the financial reports of incorporated small firms are 
often incomplete and erroneous. Finally, the earnings data of small firms are flawed by the 
practice of paying “disguised” minimum wages.7 The inclusion of small firms would also  raise the 
risk of measurement error in the analysis of spillover effects since the probability of not observing 
an ex-MNE employee in a 50-percent sample is much higher in small establishments. We 
iteratively removed workers and firms with less than two data points, zero wages and missing 
covariates.  
After these steps of data cleaning, we are left with a sample of 19,961,622 person-months 
belonging to 344,203 skilled workers and 119,580 firms. 52.6 percent of the workers had at least 
one spell of employment in the foreign sector of which 21.5 percent worked only in MNEs. We 
draw special sub-samples from this starting population for the study of lagged returns and 
spillover effects. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
3.2. MNEs in Hungary 
In the first decade after the start of the transition, Hungary was the most successful country within 
the former Soviet bloc in attracting foreign capital. By 2003, the beginning of our period of 
observation, cumulative FDI inflows exceeded 40 percent of the GDP,8 multinationals employed 
15 percent of the labor force (including self-employment and the public sector into the 
denominator) and more than 30 percent of private sector employees. They produced 20 percent 
of the GDP and delivered over two-thirds of the exports (Balatoni and Pitz 2012). Large 
multinationals, including Audi, General Motors and Suzuki, dominated the motor industry, and 
                                                          
4 See Appendix Table A2 for variable definitions. 
5 Setting the limit elsewhere does not affect the results, since 93 percent of the firms with nonzero foreign presence are 
majority foreign-owned.  
6 In 2014, MNEs had a 4.5 percent employment share in the 1-10 workers category. (Authors' calculation based on the 
2014 Q4 wave of the Labor Force Survey). 
7 This term hints at the practice of paying workers the minimum wage (subject to taxation) and the rest of their 
remuneration in cash. Elek et al. (2012) estimate that in 2006 the share of workers paid in this way amounted to 20 
percent in firms employing 5–10 workers, 10 percent in slightly higher firms (11–20 workers) and less than 3 percent 
in larger enterprises. 
8 UNECE 2001, pp. 190. 
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foreign presence was already significant in the tobacco, leather, chemical, rubber and electronics 
industries, with employment shares of between 50 and 80 percent.  
Table 1: Foreign ownership in Hungary, 2003 
 
 Fraction employed in MNEs 
 (percent of all person-months in the 
given industry) 
Industrial composition of MNEs 
(percent of all person-months in the 
MNE sector) 
 
 All workers Skilled  workers All workers Skilled workers 
Agriculture 5.0 6.1 0.8 0.5 
Manufacturing 46.5 48.4 59.9 40.5 
Construction 7.7 10.6 1.5 1.9 
Energy, water, gas 57.5 55.6 3.3 3.1 
Wholesale and retail trade 25.9 34.5 16.3 31.5 
Finance and insurance 52.7 80.0 11.4 11.5 
Services 20.7 24.3 6.8 11.0 
Average/Total 34.8 37.6 100.0 100.0 
The data are annual averages observed in the estimation sample in 2003. The number of person-months amount to 8,704,486 (all 
workers) and  2,068,556 (skilled workers).  
 
Almost three-fourths of the cumulative FDI inflows have arrived in sectors outside of 
manufacturing. As shown in column 4 of Table 1, nearly 60 percent of the skilled employees within 
the MNE sector worked in the tertiary sector. Therefore, we do not restrict the analysis to 
manufacturing, as most papers do in the strand of the literature we follow (see Barry et al. 2005, 
Görg and Strobl 2005, Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004, Smarzynska-Javorcik 2004 and Balsvik 2011 as 
opposed to Poole 2013, whose study covers all sectors in Brazil). While FDI typically boosts 
exports and generates demand for domestic manufacturers producing intermediate goods, its 
contribution to the quality of retail trade, banking and services can be equally important, 
especially in the former state socialist countries, which started the transition with critically 
undeveloped non-tradable sectors. 
Table 2: Domestic firms connected with MNEs via worker turnover in 2003-2011 
 
 Domestic employers of  
 Unskilled Middling Skilled 
Fraction connected with MNEs: workers 
Unweighted mean (domestic employers=100) 8.1 38.2 37.2 
Weighted mean (domestic firm employees =100) 53.0 88.6 69.0 
The data cover 156,626 domestic firms. A firm is classified as connected if it employed at least one worker with past MNE 
experience in 2003-2011. Companies changing majority owner are excluded.   
 
The foreign-owned and domestic parts of the economy are closely connected via labor turnover. 
In the skilled labor market, 37.2 percent of the domestic firms, employing 69 percent of the 
domestic labor force, hired at least one ex-MNE worker in 2003–2011 (Table 2). The magnitudes 
are similar in the case of medium-skilled labor but substantially lower in the case of the unskilled 
market where 91.9 percent of the firms did not employ ex-MNE workers in the observed period. 
These firms are typically small as suggested by the contrast between the unweighted and 
weighted means. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics on wages and wage change 
Table 3 presents raw statistics on wage levels across ownership categories and wage changes 
associated with skilled workers’ shifts between the categories. The data shows huge differences 
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between workers in MNEs versus domestic firms, on the one hand, and domestic firm employees 
hired from MNEs versus workers coming from other domestic enterprises, on the other. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Wage levels and wage changes of skilled workers 
 
 Mean St. dev. Observations 
Wage levels    
Employer = MNE 3.09 2.88 7,937,675a 
Employer = Domestic firm  1.43 1.61 12,023,947a 
Wage change upon leaving an MNE for a domestic firm    
- mean -0.57 1.46 42,479b 
- median -0.26 .. 42,479b 
Wage change upon leaving a domestic firm for an MNE    
- mean 0.64 1.26 46,590b 
- median 0.39 .. 46,590b 
Wages of domestic firm employees with outside experience    
Previous employer = MNE 1.71 1.93 963,075a 
Previous employer = domestic firm 1.18 1.22 3,557,788a 
a) The figures relate to person-months observed in 2003-2011. b) The figures relate to persons changing sector and show the 
change in average earnings in the receiving firm relative to average earnings in the sending firm.  
 
According to the raw data, MNE employees earn more than twice as much as do domestic sector 
workers. Persons moving from domestic firms to MNEs gain 64 percentage points on average, 
while individuals who move to the other direction lose 57 points. Measured with the median 
rather than the mean the gain and the loss amount to 39 and -26 percentage points, respectively.9 
The bottom block suggests a large raw premium for outside experience in foreign-owned 
enterprises. In the forthcoming sections, we try to disentangle a “pure” ownership-specific effect 
from differences in composition. 
4. Benchmark models 
4.1. Estimating the foreign-domestic wage gap 
Our first model estimates the foreign-domestic wage gap in the following way: 
(1) ln 𝑤 = 𝛿𝐹 + [𝜑𝑃 ] + 𝛼𝑋 + 𝛽𝑌  + 𝛾𝑉 + 𝑣 + 𝑓 + 𝑠 + 𝜀  
where 𝑤  is the daily average (relative) earnings of person 𝑖 at firm 𝑗 and month 𝑡, 𝐹 is a dummy 
for being employed in a majority foreign-owned firm, 𝑃  and 𝑋  are fixed and time varying 
individual attributes, Yijt stands for job-specific variables (like occupation and tenure), 𝑉  denotes 
time varying firm-specific covariates, 𝑣  and 𝑓  are worker and firm fixed effects, respectively, and 
ijt is an error term. We allow for unobserved shocks to productivity by including sector-year 
interactions 𝑠 . The firm-level variables are size, the capital-labor ratio and a dummy for 
exporters. Alternatively, we use indicators of investment and productivity. We gradually move 
from an OLS equation only controlled for 𝑠  to fixed-effects models with all the covariates except 
for the 𝑃  variables.  
When the equation is estimated with OLS, the  parameter captures the ownership effect, plus the 
employment-duration weighted average residual worker and firm effects given personal 
characteristics 𝑃 and 𝑋 (Abowd et al. 2006). The person fixed effects absorb the unobserved time 
invariant mean “qualities” of workers but the estimated gap is still affected by the employment-
duration weighted average of the firm effects for the firms in which the worker was employed. 
                                                          
9 See Appendix Figure A2 for a box-and-whiskers plot of wage changes. 
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When both person and firm fixed effects are included,  captures a pure ownership effect 
identified from worker flows between ownership categories, on the one hand, and changes in 
ownership, on the other.10 It shows the wage advantage of a foreign firm employee over a domestic 
worker with similar observable attributes, controlled for their average wages in the entire period 
of observation and also controlled for average wages of the firms where they worked during the 
period of observation. 
Several methods have been developed in the last ten years (following the pioneering work of 
Abowd et al. 1999) to deal with two or more high dimensional fixed effects. The iterative methods 
(Cornelissen 2008, Martins and Opromolla 2009, Guimaraes and Portugal 2010, Carneiro et al. 
2012, Mittag 2016) solve the problem by shuffling between the estimation of the slope and the 
intercept parameters.  Balázsi et al (2018) yield an alternative, which presses more on memory 
but runs faster. Earlier drafts of this paper like Balázsi (2017) experimented with this method. 
With the size of the final data iterative approaches turned out to be more effective. Therefore we 
use the method of Guimaraes (2009) implemented in Stata under the name reg2hdfe. 
4.2. Estimating lagged returns 
The identification challenge at this point is that worker mobility is not random. If a worker is fired 
from her current job, it may be because her marginal product is lower than average. If a new 
employer attracts a worker, it may be because of a higher-than-average marginal product. We 
instrument worker mobility with mass layoffs at the sending firm, which are more likely to be 
exogenous to the productivity of the individual worker.11 
In Equation (2), we compare workers in domestic firms, who arrived at their employers from 
MNEs versus other domestic firms. The estimates are controlled for personal characteristics, 
current and past job attributes, tenure in the last job, months between the two jobs, selected 
indicators of the sending and receiving firms and sector-year interactions. We retain firms with at 
least one ex-MNE and one ex-domestic employee and exclude firms undergoing acquisition. 
(2) ln 𝑤 = 𝛼𝑋 + 𝛽 𝐹_𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽 𝑑𝐿  + 𝛽 𝐹_𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑑𝐿  + 𝑓 + 𝑠 + 𝜀  
𝐹_𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  is a dummy set to 1 for workers, who arrived from foreign firms and 0 for workers 
arriving from domestic companies. 𝑑𝐿  =𝐿 , /𝐿 ,  measures the change of employment in the 
sending firm between year 𝑡– 1 and 𝑡 + 1, with 𝑡 denoting the year when the worker left the firm. 
The coefficient 𝛽  measures how wages vary with employment dynamics of the sending domestic 
firms while the parameter 𝛽  of the interaction term 𝐹_𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑑𝐿   captures the impact of dL 
on workers arriving from foreign employers. The wage advantage of workers arriving from MNEs 
over workers arriving from domestic firms, conditional on employment dynamics of the sending 
firm, is given by 𝛽  + 𝛽 𝑑𝐿  . Alternatively, we estimate the equation for three groups 
distinguished on the basis of 𝑑𝐿 (lower than 0.5, between 0.5 and 1 and higher than 1), without 
the size-change and interaction terms. 
                                                          
10 The only exception would be observations on firms that, at the same time as changing ownership, would change all 
of their employees. We do not have such cases in the data.  
11The dataset provides no direct information on the reason for separation. 
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Since we are interested in the within-sector and within-firm wage differences between ex-MNE 
and ex-domestic entrants (rather than how a worker’s wage changes upon entering a domestic 
firm), we include firm fixed effects but not worker fixed effects.  
4.3. Estimating spillover effects 
We estimate spillover effects for the sample of domestic firm employees with no outside work 
experience in the observed period. Their wages are regressed on a set of controls and variables 
measuring the share of workers with previous outside experience within the worker’s company 
and skill category. We deviate from Poole (2013) in that we also study how skilled incumbents’ 
wages respond to the presence of less skilled ex-MNE peers. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 , , for instance, 
measures the ratio of unskilled employees with recent MNE experience. 
(3) ln 𝑤 = 𝜃 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 , + 𝜃 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 , + 𝜃 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 , +
𝜃 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 , + 𝜃 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
,
+ 𝜃 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 , + 𝛼𝑋  +
 𝛽𝑌  + 𝛾𝑉 + 𝑣 + 𝑠 + 𝜀  
We estimate the model including only worker fixed effects, which also absorb the firm effects since 
the estimates relate to incumbent workers. The controls are identical to those used in Equation 1. 
We restrict the time window to 2005–2011 to leave time for the accumulation of an ex-MNE stock. 
The equations are estimated separately for smaller (11–50) and larger (50+) firms, taking into 
consideration the higher risk of measurement error in small establishments.  
5. Results of the benchmark models 
5.1. Wage gap 
In Model A of Table 4, which measures the wage advantage of MNE employees relative to domestic 
firm employees, the estimate falls from 0.745 log points to only 0.718 after controlling for 
observed worker characteristics. The inclusion of firm size, the capital-labor ratio and exports 
bring the estimated MNE premium down to 0.437, while adding worker fixed effects reduces it to 
0.236. Adding firm fixed effects results in a major drop to only 0.031.  
Controlling the worker fixed effect model for TFP or value added per worker instead of the firm 
fixed effects yield estimates of 0.218 and 0.206, respectively. Including TFP into the set of firm 
controls in specification (4) results in a coefficient of 0.209. Including investment as well, which 
controls for the potential coincidence of positive productivity shocks and the hiring of high-quality 
labor, produces an estimate of 0.216. By contrast, adding firm fixed effects to specification (4) 
without including worker fixed effects decreases the estimate from 0.437 to 0.036, clearly 
indicating that selection to acquisition drives the result of the 2FE model. 
In Model B of Table 4, the observed person-months are classified by the ownership histories of 
employers. “Always domestic” (the reference category) and “always foreign” stand for monthly 
employment spells in firms which did not change majority owner in 2003–2011. “Temporarily 
foreign” and “temporarily domestic” denote the current majority owner of firms which underwent 
acquisition. The estimates suggest that firms involved in takeovers and currently operating under 
domestic ownership pay more than incumbent domestic firms (by 0.113 log points in specification 
5 where worker quality is controlled for). Switching firms currently under foreign ownership also 
pay higher wages than incumbent domestic employers (by 0.166 log points) but lower ones than 
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always foreign-owned companies (by 0.131 log points). The gap between the coefficients for 
employment spells under “temporarily foreign” and “temporarily domestic” ownership (0.051 log 
points) is an alternative measure of how changes of ownership affect the wage. The magnitudes 
make it clear that switching firms substantially differ from any of the incumbent categories. 
Table 4:  Estimates of the foreign-domestic wage gap for skilled workers, 2003-2011 
 
Specifications: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Model A       
Foreign-owned 0.745 0.763 0.718 0.437 0.236 0.031 
 (2103.9) (2189.4) (2179.5) (1157.4) (730.2) (58.0) 
aR2/within R2 0.260 0.329 0.417 0.480 0.238 0.917 
       Model B       
Always foreign-owned 0.794 0.835 0.764 0.474 0.297 .. 
 (292.9) (315.8) (309.2) (164.8) (797.9) .. 
       Temporarily foreign-owned 0.551 0.562 0.510 0.286 0.166 .. 
 (94.2) (99.4) (97.2) (56.0) (255.9) .. 
       Temporarily domestic 0.459 0.469 0.418 0.208 0.113 .. 
 (73.8) (77.3) (73.3) (39.2) (166.0)  
aR2/within R2 0.268 0.327 0.422 0.482 0.242 .. 
Controls       
Sector  year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Person FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No No No Yes 
All coefficients are significant at 0.001 level, t-values in brackets. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by persons. 
Sample: 19,961,622 person-months belonging to 344,203 skilled workers in 119,580 firms. Dependent variable: log daily wage in 
the given month relative to the national mean. Reference categories: employed in a domestic firm (Model A), employed in an 
’always domestic’ firm (Model B). Controls:  person, job and firm characteristics plus sector-year interactions. See Appendix 
Table A2 for variable definitions. Specifications 5 and 6 include only time-varying covariates and worker and firm fixed effects. 
Estimation: models (1)-(4) were estimated with OLS. Models (5) and (6) were estimated with Stata’s xtreg and reg2hdfe models, 
respectively.  
 
Appendix Figure A1 compares the estimates of Model A to ones for unskilled and medium-skilled 
workers. These are very close to each other and amount to about 0.4 log points in the uncontrolled 
model, less than 0.1 in the panel regression with worker FE and less than 0.02 in the 2FE model. 
Data available in the Labor Force Survey (Tables A3-A4 of the Appendix) furthermore suggest that 
a part of the MNE premium compensates unskilled workers for non-wage disamenities. Overtime 
work, as well as afternoon and night shifts, are about twice as likely to occur among low and 
medium-skilled MNE employees compared to their domestic counterparts. There is smaller but 
similarly signed difference concerning work on Saturdays and Sundays. Furthermore, low skilled 
workers have a higher probability of becoming unemployed in foreign than domestic firms. The 
data does not indicate ownership-specific differences of this kind among highly skilled workers—
this is one of the reasons why we restrict the analysis to them. 
5.2. Lagged returns 
The upper block of Table 5 shows the results of the models described in section 4.2. The wage 
advantage of an ex-MNE employee arriving from a firm where staff numbers did not change 
around the year of the worker’s separation (𝑑𝐿=1) amounts to 0.057 log points, while it is 
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estimated to be 0.074 points in case the sending firm was closed or relocated (𝑑𝐿=0). We added a 
dummy indicating if the worker had arrived from another domestic firm but had some experience 
in one or more MNEs before being hired by the current employer. These workers have an 
advantage of 0.064 log points. Only a part of these gaps results from within-firm advantages, as 
suggested by the differences between the specifications with and without firm fixed effects. 
Table 5: The wage advantage of ex-MNE workers in domestic firms  
over coworkers having arrived from other domestic firms – regression estimates 
 
 Firm fixed effects: 
 No Yes 
Entire sample 
Sending firm is MNE (F_After) 0.074*** 0.056*** 
 (5.7) (26.6) 
Change of employment in the sending firm (dL) 0.009** -0.012*** 
 (2.4) (18.6) 
Interaction term (F_After  dL) -0.017** -0.013*** 
 (2.0) (9.7) 
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm (dummy) 0.064*** 0.025*** 
 (7.4) (14.8) 
Number of observations 797,261 797,261 





Employment change in the sending firm: Lt+1/Lt-1  0.5 
Sending firm is MNE  0.141*** 0.065*** 
 (5.8) (11.0) 
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm (dummy) 0.076*** 0.056*** 
 (4.1) (16.0) 
Number of observations 160,028 160,028 
aR2 / within R2 0.489 0.280 
   
Employment change in the sending firm: 0.5 < Lt+1/Lt-1< 1 
Sending firm is MNE 0.033*** 0.054*** 
 (2.5) (24.2) 
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm (dummy) 0.054*** 0.045*** 
 (4.0) (7.1) 
Number of observations 336,550 336,550 
aR2 / within R2 0.484 0.286 
   
Employment change in the sending firm: Lt+1/Lt-1 1 
Sending firm is MNE 0.073*** 0.046*** 
 (5.2) (19.6) 
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm 0.064*** 0.027*** 
 (4.7) (11.4) 
Number of observations 297,587 297,587 
aR2 / within R2 0.463 0.275 
 
Significance: ***) 0.01 and **) 0.05 level. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by persons. Sample: 797,261 person-
months belonging to 96,277 skilled workers in 19,449 domestic firms, who had arrived from MNEs versus other domestic firms. 
Estimation: specifications are pooled OLS and panel regression with firm fixed effects. Change of employment in the sending firm: 
Lt+1/Lt-1. , where indices stand for years and t is the year of separation. Controls: person, job and firm characteristics listed in Table 
A2, except for sector-year interactions. Additional controls are completed tenure in the sending firm, dummy for unobserved 
tenure, months between the exit from the sending firm and entry to the receiving firm, one-digit sectoral affiliation of the sending 
and receiving firms and year dummies. 
 
The lower blocks of the table display estimates on sub-samples distinguished along 𝑑𝐿. Former 
MNE workers who lost or left their jobs during mass dismissals (𝑑𝐿<0.5) had substantially higher 
wage advantages over their ex-domestic counterparts (0.141 log points) than did those ex-MNE 
workers, who arrived from slightly contracting firms (0.033) or ones with stable or increasing 
levels of employment (0.073).  
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Workers who leave well-paying jobs in the MNE sector individually can be either negatively or 
positively selected. On the one hand, MNE employees fired individually are likely to be less 
productive than the average. On the other hand, the lucky few who manage to find a well-paid 
domestic job are predictably over-represented among voluntary quitters. The comparison of 
group-level estimates suggests that the first effect dominates: workers separating from their firms 
for reasons other than mass dismissals earn a lower lagged MNE premium on average. 
Note that the group-wise estimates controlled for firm fixed effects are much closer to each other 
than the uncontrolled ones. The outstanding advantage of workers arriving at the domestic sector 
from shrinking, closing or relocating MNEs seems to result from the propensity (and ability) of 
high-wage domestic firms to receive them. 
Also note that the above results refer to a sample of 797,261 person-months, only 6.6 percent of 
all monthly spells observed in the domestic sector. The restrictions (such as the exclusion of left-
censored employment spells, the need to observe at least two employment spells per worker, the 
sending firm’s level of employment in three consecutive years, the withholding of firms with at 
least one worker coming from an MNE and one coming from another domestic enterprise) imply 
a major loss of observations despite a relatively wide time window. Therefore, in Section 6 we will 
estimate an alternative model based on a much bigger set of observations.  
5.3. Results on spillovers  
The fixed-effects panel equations summarized in Table 6 regress the log wages of incumbent 
skilled domestic workers on the share of workers with outside experience within the worker’s 
firm and skill group. The estimated own effect for skilled workers in a medium-sized or large firm 
(𝜃 = 0.074) implies that a one-standard-deviation difference in the share of high skilled ex-MNE 
employees (0.18) shifts the wages of skilled incumbents up by 1.3 percent. Having more skilled 
peers with outside experience in the domestic sector has no effect. 
Table 6: The effect of coworkers with recent outside work experience on the  
wages of skilled incumbents in domestic firms 2005-2011 
 
 
Share of coworkers with  
recent MNE experience  
within skill groups 
Share of coworkers with  
recent experience in other domestic  
firms within skill groups 
 Unskilled Middling Skilled Unskilled Middling Skilled 
Notations in Equation 3: F1 F2 F3 D1 D2 D3 
All firms 0.012* 0.003 0.042*** 0.015*** 0.01 -0.031*** 
 (2.0) (0.4) (4.9) (4.3) (1.9) (-5.5) 
Firms employing >50 workers 0.000 0.02* 0.074*** 0.005 0.042*** -0.027** 
 (0.0) (1.9) (6.0) (1.0) (4.3) (-3.0) 
Significant at *) 0.1, **) 0.5, ***) 0.01 level. The t-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by persons. θ is 
significantly larger than θ , θ  and θ . Sample: 3,737,504 person-months in 122,205 firms in the full sample, 2,478,631 
person-months in 81,200 firms in the 50+ sample. Dependent variable: log daily wage in the given month relative to the 
national mean. Controls:  person, job and firm characteristics, sector-year interactions, and worker fixed-effects. 
  
In evaluating the cross effects, one should take into account the relevant range in the share of ex-
MNE workers. While a jump from zero to 50 or 100 percent in the share of ex-foreign workers 
within the unskilled or medium-skilled workforce is beyond the realm of reality, which renders 
the spillover effect to be weak, this can easily happen in the high skilled category. Domestic firms 
employing 50 workers have 7 high skilled workers on average. Hiring two managers or 
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professionals with foreign sector experience can increase the ex-MNE share from zero to almost 
30 percent overnight, which implies a 0.022 log points wage increase for skilled incumbents. 
6. Supplementary and alternative estimations 
6.1. Exploiting information on new firms 
As much as 94.8 percent of the firms in our estimation sample did not change majority owner in 
the nine-year period covered by the data: 7.3 percent was foreign-owned and 87.5 percent was 
domestic throughout the observed period. Rather than simply neglecting the huge wage difference 
between them (as does the 2FE model), we exploit information on newly established and 
subsequently incumbent foreign and domestic firms. The critical event under examination here is 
not the takeover of an existing firm, but the birth of an incumbent firm.  
The analysis relates to incumbent workers in incumbent firms established after 2003 and staying 
under majority foreign or domestic control until 2011. We base the definition of a “new firm” on 
its employment dynamics rather than its date of registration, since the latter is often associated 
with break-ups, mergers and acquisitions, rather than the birth of a new economic actor. We rely 
on the fact that a medium-sized or large firm’s creation typically begins with hiring a small group 
of managers who arrange the start-up. This preparatory stage is followed by a “big bang” when 
rank-and-file employees are hired. We speak of a big bang when a firm’s staff jumps from an initial 
level of 𝐿 5 to 𝐿 50, or, from 𝐿 50 to 𝐿 300 within a month. We found 519 such firms 
with no subsequent change of ownership. Combined employment in these enterprises jumped 
from 6,728 one year before the big bang to 126,544 one year after the big bang (an estimated 
growth from 13 to 253 thousand taking into account the 50 percent sampling quota). See 
Appendix Figure A3 for the evolution of staff numbers in the firms in question. 
Table 7: Wages before and after entry to new MNEs and new domestic firms 
 
 Coeff. t-test Person-months 
Workers of domestic start-ups, before their entry ref.  115,443 
Workers of foreign-owned start-ups, before their entry  0.217*** 14.3 146,585 
Workers of domestic start-ups, after their entry -0.018 1.9 84,018 
Workers of foreign-owned start-ups, after their entry 0.379*** 22.2 125,247 
    Double difference (point estimate) 0.158 9.1  
Significant at *) 0.1, ***) 0.01 level. The t-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by persons.  
OLS regression with dummies standing for the four distinct groups. Dependent variable: log daily wage in the given month 
relative to the national mean. Sample: 471,293 person-months belonging to 8,225 skilled workers hired by and staying until 
December 2011 in 519 newly established firms (366 domestic and 147 foreign-owned). We considered a firm newly established 
if its staff number jumped from less than 5 to more than 50, or, from less than 50 to more than 300 within a month. Workers 
employed by new firms before their ‘big bang’, workers leaving the new firms and firms changing owner after the big bang 
are excluded. Controls: person, job and firm characteristics and sector-year interactions. See Appendix Table A2 for variable 
definitions. 
 
We estimate a single wage equation with dummies standing for interactions of the ownership of 
the new firm and the period relative to the date of entry to these firms. Since assignment to the 
groups compared is person-specific, and the firms do not change owner, we estimate the wage 
gap with pooled OLS. A large battery of controls guarantees that we compare workers and firms 
with similar characteristics. 
The results in Table 7 indicate a wage gap of 0.397 log points between skilled workers in new 
MNEs versus new domestic firms—this is fairly close to the 0.437 log points gap estimated with a 
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fully controlled OLS for all firms in Table 4, specification 4. The workers of new foreign firms also 
earned more than their domestic counterparts before their entry to the new firms by 0.217 log 
points on average. Deducting this difference from the post-entry gap suggests that an ownership-
specific wage differential of 0.158 log points remains between incumbent workers in incumbent 
firms. This estimate falls between the individual only and the two fixed-effects parameters, 
suggesting a significantly larger pure ownership-specific effect than the 2FE model.  
6.2. An overlapping cohorts model of lagged returns to MNE experience 
We estimate an alternative model to identify the private returns to MNE experience by comparing 
the wages of domestic firm employees with past and future experience in MNEs versus domestic 
companies other than their current employer. This approach is close in spirit to models that study 
the wage effect of incarceration by comparing past and future convicts (Grogger 1995, Pettit and 
Lyons 2009, LaLonde and Cho 2008, Czafit and Köllő 2015) under the assumption that the date of 
incarceration (mutatis mutandis the dates of entry to and exit from MNEs) can be treated as 
random. 
The sample we work with consists of domestic firm employees in companies employing at least 
one worker with past or future outside experience and one incumbent worker. We restrict the 
analysis to 2005–2009 to have sufficient observations on both past and future experience outside 
the workers’ current firms. Even so, the estimates relate to nearly 4 million monthly observations 
belonging to 153 thousand workers in 18.5 thousand firms.  
Table 8: Wage difference between domestic workers with/without outside work experience 
 
 Dependent variable: log daily wage 
 OLS Firm fixed effects 
Past MNE experience (PF) 0.060*** (11.6) 0.005*** (6.5) 
Future MNE experience (FF) 0.012 (1.6) 0.001 (0.6) 
Past outside domestic experience (PD) -0.052*** (12.4) -0.030*** (47.2) 
Future outside domestic experience (FD) -0.031*** (6.7) -0.016*** (22.4) 
Differences by type of outside experience    
Past MNE – Past domestic  0.112 (21.6) 0.035 (41.4) 
Future MNE – Future domestic  0.043 (5.4) 0.017 (11.8) 
Double difference  0.069 (7.7) 0.018 (11.5) 
F-test of the double difference being zero 58.7 (0.0000) 132.6 (0.0000) 
aR2/within R2 0.453  0.342  
Regression estimates. The reported coefficients are significant at the ***) 0.01 level. Sample: 3,841,561 person-months belonging 
to 153,323 persons and 18,510 firms. The sample covers domestic firm employees in firms employing at least one worker with 
past or future outside experience and one incumbent worker. The coefficients measure wage advantages relative to incumbent 
workers. Observations for 2005-2009 are used. Estimation: OLS and firm fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by persons. Controls: person, job and firm controls, and sector-year interactions.  
 
We define a collectively exhaustive classification making a distinction between workers with past 
MNE experience (PF), workers with future but no past MNE experience (FF), workers with past 
experience in other domestic firms and no MNE experience (PD) and workers with future 
domestic sector experience and none of the aforementioned types (FD). Incumbent workers who 
had no contact with other employers in 2003–2011 constitute the reference category. We regress 
log wages on the respective dummies and person, job and firm-specific controls plus sector-year 
interactions. 
We measure the effect of foreign sector experience with the double difference (𝛽  – 𝛽 ) – (𝛽  
– 𝛽 ) or equivalently (𝛽  – 𝛽 ) – (𝛽  – 𝛽 ). The model controls for unobserved differentials 
in worker quality as long as the wages of workers with future outside experience can be treated 
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as a counterfactual for the wages of workers with past experience. However, it cannot address the 
possibly endogenous selection of workers to separation from their previous employers. 
The results in Table 8 show that workers with past MNE experience earn more by 0.112 log points 
than their counterparts with outside domestic experience. This difference overestimates the 
returns to foreign sector experience since those domestic workers who are on their way to a 
foreign firm also earn more by 0.043 log points than those who are about to leave for a domestic 
employer. Using these estimates, we can approximate the return to MNE work experience as the 
double difference (𝛽  – 𝛽 ) – (𝛽  – 𝛽 ) equal to 0.069 log points.  
The results of the two models aimed at measuring lagged wage effects (Tables 5 and 8) are similar: 
the first model identified a 0.057 log points advantage on the part of the median skilled worker 
arriving from a foreign firm with stable employment level (dL=1) over a worker arriving from a 
similar domestic company (see column 1 of Table 5). A relatively small difference between the 
two results can partly result from the fact that the second model included more persons working 
for MNEs over a long period.  
In column 2 of Table 8, we reestimate the model by adding firm fixed effects. Similar to the first 
model, the contrasts fade away: the within-firm wage differentials are much smaller, and the 
double difference drops to only 0.018 log points, suggesting that the lagged MNE premium 
predominantly stems from the crowding of past and future MNE employees in high-wage 
domestic firms. 
6.3. Reestimating spillover effects 
Incumbents in our data account for only 22 percent of the workers ever employed in the domestic 
sector and 34 percent of the workers never employed outside the domestic sector. The estimates 
of spillover effects using their sample may be biased because their exposure to peers with MNE 
experience differs substantially from that of the average worker. As shown in Table 9, the mean 
within-firm share of skilled MNE-experienced peers amounts to 9 percent in the case of skilled 
incumbents as opposed to 14.6 percent in the case of their non-incumbent counterparts. The 
relative magnitudes are similar for less skilled coworkers—a predictable pattern since 
incumbents are more likely to be found in firms with low labor turnover. 
A higher share of ex-MNE peers increases the likelihood of personal contacts, thereby assisting 
the diffusion of MNE-based skills within the firm. At the same time, the typical incumbent worker 
spends more time with the firm, so she has a better chance to absorb the imported knowledge. 
Because of the potential bias in either direction, we reestimate the spillover model for all domestic 
Table 9: Mean within-firm share of coworkers with past MNE experience (percent) 
 
 Skilled incumbents in domestic 
firms 









Share of coworkers 
with MNE experience 
Number 
of workers 
Unskilled 7.0 38,355 13.3 73,320 
Medium skilled 9.3 53,896 15.4 103,871 
Skilled 9.0 55,900 14.6 107,250 
Incumbents are workers, who had only a single domestic-owned employer in 2003-2011. The mean within-firm shares are 




workers, now including firm fixed effects on top of the worker fixed effects in the model to ensure 
that it identifies within-firm impacts. 
Table 10: The effect of coworkers with recent outside work experience on the  
wages of skilled workers in domestic enterprises 2005-2011 
 
 
Share of coworkers with  
recent MNE experience  
by their level of skill  
Share of coworkers with  
recent experience in other domestic  
firms by their level of skill 
 Unskilled Middling Skilled Unskilled Middling Skilled 
Notations in Equation 3: F1 F2 F3 D1 D2 D3 
All domestic firms 0.007 0.012 0.021* 0.015*** 0.022*** -0.040*** 
 (1.3) (1.8) (2.5) (4.7) (4.2) (-6.0) 
Domestic firms employing >50 
workers 0.006 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.001 0.057*** -0.024* 
 (0.9) (3.4) (4.9) (0.3) (5.5) (-2.5) 
Significant at *) 0.1, ***) 0.01 level. The t-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by persons. 𝜃 is 
significantly bigger than 𝜃 and 𝜃 , but not 𝜃 . 𝜃  is significantly bigger than 𝜃 . 
Sample: 3,737,504 person-months belonging to skilled workers in 122,205 firms in full sample, 2,478,631 person-months in 
81,200 firms in the 50+ sample. Dependent variable: log daily wage in the given month relative to the national mean. Controls:  
person, job and firm characteristics, sector-year interactions, worker and firm fixed-effects.  
The results for firms with more than 50 workers and all firms are presented in Table 10. Starting 
with the former: the own effect (0.058) is slightly lower than the estimate for incumbents (0.074 
in Table 5). Less skilled ex-MNE workers exert a weak effect—the respective coefficients are only 
significant at the 10 percent level. Having more peers with recent outside experience in domestic 
firms do not affect wages at all. The estimates for all firms are much lower and insignificant at 5 
percent level. The inward bias is probably explained by the noisy measurement of the F and D 
ratios in smaller enterprises. 
The estimated spillover effect might seem economically insignificant, but it is actually stronger 
than those we know from the literature. The study of Poole (2013)—which is closest to ours 
concerning method, sample characteristics and industry coverage—estimated that at the average 
wage for a typical domestic worker, a 10 percentage points increase in the share of former MNE 
workers increased incumbents’ wages by $23 per year. This amount could buy a little more than 
one Starbucks solo espresso a month in Rio de Janeiro in 2015. The comparable estimate for 
skilled incumbents in our sample is $139 a year, which could buy 5.2 cups of Starbucks espresso 
a month in Budapest at 2015 prices.12 
6.4. Differences by sectors 
Table 11 summarizes estimates of the wage gap, lagged returns and spillover effects from our 
preferred model specifications for manufacturing and all other sectors labeled “services.” The 
foreign-domestic wage gap is larger in services than manufacturing, and the lagged returns are 
broadly similar or somewhat larger in services. By contrast, the spillover effects are estimated to 
be stronger in manufacturing.  
                                                          
12The calculation is based on the estimated own effect (0.074), the mean monthly earnings of skilled domestic firm 
employees in 2011 (236,078 Ft) and an average exchange rate of 225 Ft/$ in 2011 (National Bank, 
http://mnbkozeparfolyam.hu/arfolyam-2011.html). We could find Starbucks solo espresso prices for 2015 on the 




Table 11: Selected estimates by sectors 
 
 Manufacturing Services 
Contemporaneous MNE premium   
All firms, worker FE 0.152 0.236 
New, incumbent firms, DiD 0.135 0.232 
Lagged MNE premium in domestic firms   
Sending firm is MNE, dL<0.5, OLS 0.135 0.133 
Sending firm is MNE, dL<0.5, firm FE 0.056 0.044 
Overlapping cohorts estimate, DiD 0.027 0.072 
Spillover effect, firms L>50 employees   
On incumbents 0.088 0.057 
On all workers with no MNE experience 0.069 0.050 
*) All coefficients are significant at 0.01 level. The coefficients were estimated separately for the two sectors 
 
7. Discussion 
We interpret the coincidence of an MNE premium, substantial wage loss from separation, lagged 
returns to MNE experience, and wage spillover as a signal of knowledge flows from FDI to 
domestic firms. In such a scenario, workers acquiring both general and firm-specific knowledge 
in the modern environment of MNEs are expected to earn more than their domestic counterparts. 
The specific components in their skills imply that MNE workers lose a part of their wage advantage 
in case of involuntary separation. The general component in their skills give rise to wage 
advantages in their new, domestic firm, and tend to exert a positive influence on the productivity 
of their peers. The simultaneity of these symptoms call into question some alternative 
explanations, of which we discuss three ones.  
First, the existence of a contemporaneous residual gap calls into question that the MNE premium 
results from the crowding of high productivity workers in foreign-owned enterprises.  
Second, intense human capital accumulation is admittedly not the only potential source of an MNE 
premium, with the most important alternative being efficiency wage setting.  MNEs may try to 
prevent leakage of information through labor turnover by paying a premium above the market 
level (Fosfuri et al. 2001). Their limited knowledge of the local labor market and capital-labor 
relations may urge them to pay high wages and share a part of their revenues with workers. 
Furthermore, they may try to compensate their employees for a higher labor demand volatility 
(Fabri et al. 2003) or a higher plant closure rate (Bernard and Sjoholm 2003). The implications of 
skills accumulation versus efficiency wages for the foreign-domestic wage gap and the wage loss 
from separation are observationally identical. However, efficiency wages in MNEs do not imply 
that ex-MNE employees earn a premium over the receiving domestic firm’s going wage rate, and 
exert influence on the wages of their peers.   
Third, a set of findings like this is likely to emerge only if MNE workers accumulate both general 
and firm-specific knowledge. As outlined in the seminal paper of Becker (1962), in the case of 
general skills acquired through on-the-job training, productivity and wages move in tandem.  
Workers accumulating a substantial stock of general skills in one firm are expected to earn higher-
than-average wages in other firms and, as far as general skills develop through informal 
communication between coworkers, their presence also tends to have a spillover effect. However, 
in this scenario, we do not expect that separation from an MNE induces a wage loss.  
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If the acquired knowledge is purely firm-specific, and the risk of voluntary separation (motivated 
by factors other than between-firm wage differentials) is zero, then the firm pays the going market 
wage before, during and after the period of skills accumulation. These skills lose their value with 
separation without an impact on wages: pre- and post-separation wages are equal, post-
separation wages do not exceed the host firm’s average level and do not exert influence on the 
earnings of coworkers. In the likely case of non-zero risk of voluntary quits, the firm will share in 
the costs and benefits of training which implies lower wages in the accumulation phase and higher 
wages afterward as long as the worker stays with her employer. In this case, post-training 
involuntary separations imply a wage loss, but we continue not to expect lagged returns and 
spillover effects.  
The literature emanating from Becker’s benchmark models has been trying to reconcile the theory 
of on-the-job training with a series of empirical observations inconsistent with the extreme 
scenarios. A series of empirical findings and ample everyday experience suggest that (i) most 
skills are general, or at least sector rather than firm-specific (ii) enterprises are willing to pay for 
general training and (iii) involuntary separations typically imply a loss. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999) demonstrate that in a variety of market settings such as a compressed wage structure, 
substantial hiring costs, information asymmetry, and other labor market imperfections, general 
skills are rewarded as if they were partly specific. The “skill-weights” model of Lazear (2009) 
hypothesizes that skills are predominantly general, but firms attach different weights to their 
components. A worker who leaves a firm will have a difficult time finding another firm that can 
make use of all the skills he acquired at the first firm. The limits of transferability impose a cost 
on mobile workers, so the workers are unwilling to bear the full cost of training, and the costs and 
benefits will be shared. Such a setting is likely to produce all of the four outcomes observed in our 
data. 
8. Conclusions 
We found that high skilled MNE workers earn substantially higher wages than their domestic 
counterparts. They lose a part of their wage advantage after leaving the foreign-owned sector but, 
even so, they earn more than their domestic sector colleagues with no MNE experience. Their 
presence in domestic firms exerts a positive effect on the wages of their peers, who had no contact 
with foreign-owned firms or had no recent outside work experience at all.  
The direct and indirect wage returns to work experience in MNEs are large in Hungary, similar to 
less developed countries analyzed in the literature. The positive wage effects are not restricted to 
the manufacturing sector, which is in the focus of attention in the research on FDI. 
The estimates suggest that the effect of MNE experience on domestic sector wages is 
predominantly explained by between-firm variance, that is, the higher-than-average wages of 
domestic firms connected with the MNEs via labor turnover. 
Last but not least, the results draw attention to the difficulties of identifying a ‘pure’ ownership 
effect. Identification of the foreign-domestic wage gap from acquisitions is flawed by the non-
random selection of firms to buy-outs. In the analysis of lagged returns and spillovers, there is a 
trade-off between model quality, on the one hand, and unbiasedness of the sample on which the 
model can be estimated, on the other. 
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Figure A1: Estimates of the foreign-domestic wage gap by skills 
 
Specifications. 1: Sector-year interactions 2: + person controls 3: + job controls 




















Figure A2: Shifts between sectors and wage change 
 
The data relate to 307,874 shifts on the part of skilled workers between ownership sectors 
in 2003-2011. F and D denote foreign-owned and domestic firms, respectively, in 
chronological order. The boxes display the interquartile ranges of log wage changes, with 
a horizontal line within the box indicating the median, and the whiskers showing the 
highest and lowest adjacent values. Heavy outliers are excluded. Wage change is 
measured as ln(w1/w0), where  w1 and w0 are average earnings in the job spells after and 




Figure A3: The mean size of firms classified as newly established 
 
Start-ups Other booming firms 
  
The data relate to 544 firms the size of which jumped from less than 5 to more than 50, or from less than 50 to more than 300 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics – All skill levels 
 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Male .583  0 1 
Age 38.49 11.0 7 82 
Low skilled .147    
Middling .602  0 1 
High skilled .251  0 1 
Months of non-employment in 2003-2011 31.1 29.2 0 108 
Log health expenditures/national average wage -2.08 1.8 -12.08 7.14 
Receives disability pension/payment .013  0 1 
Receives care benefit .012  0 1 
Log regional unemployment rate -2.59 .390 -3.32 -1.73 
Central Hungary including Budapest .307  0 1 
Tenure is unobserved .386  0 1 
Tenure (months) 12.87 18.6 0 108 
     
Top manager .037    
Other manager .075  0 1 
Professional .073  0 1 
Other white collar  .206  0 1 
Skilled blue collar .356  0 1 
Assembler, machine operator .169  0 1 
Elementary occupation   .101  0 1 
Unspecified  occupation .020  0 1 
     
Agriculture .044    
Manufacturing   .362  0 1 
Construction   .066  0 1 
Trade   .188  0 1 
Finance   .035  0 1 
Energy   .023  0 1 
Services   .281  0 1 
     
Foreign .326    
Domestic      .616  0 1 
Public sector   .046  0 1 
Other, unspecified   .012  0 1 
     
Firm size (log) 4.94 2.25 -.693 10.88 
Fixed assets per worker (log) 7.78 1.86 -5.01 17.59 
Share of exports in sales revenues .212 .349 0 1 
Each variable covers 92,663,887 person months. The spells belong to workers employed at least once in 
a firm, the size of which exceeded the 10 workers limit at least once in 2003-2011.  






Table A2: Pooled OLS results for equation 1, specification 4 
Skilled workers, 2003-2011 
 
 Coefficient t-value 
Majority ownerb   
Foreign 0.437 1157.4 
Personal characteristics   
Male 0.154 515.6 
Age 0.032 270.9 
Age squared/100 -0.033 220.0 
Months spent non-employed in 2003-2011 -0.003 446.5 
Receipt of disability payment -0.373 164.7 
Receipt of care allowance -0.207 117.0 
Health expenditures (log) 0.002 51.8 
Job characteristicsd   
Tenure if observed 0.001 117.6 
Tenure is unobserved 0.138 333.1 
Spell lasting for one day 0.354 3.3 
Top manager ref.  
Other managers   -0.062 71.0 
Professional   -0.016 18.0 
Other white collar   -0.298 335.7 
Skilled blue collar   -0.607 679.4 
Assembler, machine operator   -0.728 672.7 
Laborer in elementary occupation -0.821 659.2 
Regional unemployment rate (log) -0.063 107.7 
Budapest 0.142 371.9 
Firm characteristics   
Firm size (log) 0.086 1018.6 
Capital-labor ratio (log) 0.041 467.8 
Exporter 0.185 540.5 
Constant -1.650 436.0 
Adjusted R-squared 0.479  
Number of observations 19,961,622  
Dependent variable: log daily earnings. For the exact definition of the variables see the Data Appendix.  The coefficients of 63 




Table A3: Incidence of atypical work schedules in foreign and domestic enterprises 
2003-2011, percent 
 
Level of educationa Domestic Foreign  Domestic Foreign 
 Shift workb  Overtime workb 
Low 27.5 58.2  14.4 32.0 
Middling 22.4 41.2  12.0 24.3 
High 4.4 4.5  4.0 7.6 
 Work in the afternoonc  Work in the nightc 
Low 14.4 29.1  8.1 20.3 
Middling 18.6 33.1  9.4 22.1 
High 17.7 14.4  7.1 6.6 
 Work on Saturdaysc  Work on Sundaysc 
Low 26.3 29.3  16.9 17.6 
Middling 35.4 36.6  21.2 24.0 
High 26.8 18.9  16.7 12.7 
a) Low=primary school attainment, High=college or university, Middling=rest 
b) Source: Wage Surveys, 2003-2011, private sector. Firms are classified on the basis of their majority owners 
The data indicate the percentage share of employees receiving shift pay and overtime pay, respectively. Authors’ calculation. 
c) Source: Labor Force Surveys, 2003 Q1 – 2011 Q4., excluding public administration, education, health and social services. The 
data indicate the percentage share of employees working in the respective periods at least occasionally. Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Table A4: The effect of ownership on the probability of becoming unemployed - Logit odds ratios 
 
 Educational attainmenta 
 Low Middling High 
































82,638 205,597 227,074 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.067 0.068 
Wald chi2 (51) 617.4*** 958.0*** 763.8*** 
Significant at the **) 0.5 and ***) 0.01 level. 
Discrete time survival model, logit form, following (Jenkins 1985). Estimated for the pool of 28 quarterly waves of the Labor Force 
Survey in 2003-2009. The estimation excludes the crisis period (2010 and 2011). Sample: employees. Dependent variable: 1 if the 
person was ILO-OECD unemployed in wave t+1 and 0 otherwise.  The coefficients of 19 county dummies and 27 wave dummies are 
not shown.  







Table A5: On-the-job training: fraction participating among MNE and domestic firm employees 
High skilled employees working at least one hour in the reference week = 1 
 
 Foreign Domestic Ratio 
2003 0.102 0.065 1.57 
2004 0.100 0.060 1.67 
2005 0.043 0.024 1.80 
2006 0.045 0.019 2.41 
2007 0.033 0.019 1.73 
2008 0.024 0.019 1.30 
2009 0.020 0.013 1.59 
2010 0.025 0.015 1.59 
2011 0.021 0.014 1.61 
Source: Authors’ calculation using waves 45-80 of the LFS. Sample: ILO-OECD employed with college or university background. Key 
variables: participates in training of any kind outside the school system; the employer is majority or minority foreign-owned.  
Note that the question on participation changed in 2005. Figures above and below the dotted line are not directly comparable. 
 
Data Appendix 
Starting sample: 50 percent random sample drawn from Social Security Numbers (SSN, 
Hungarian TAJ) valid on January 1, 2003. SSN holders aged 5-74 were retained. Data held by the 
Pension Directorate (ONYF), the Tax Office (NAV), the Health Insurance Fund (OEP), the Office of 
Education (OH), and the Public Employment Service (NMH) were merged and anonymized by the 
National Information Service (NISZ). The original data consisted of payment records with start 
and end dates, a type-of-payment code and amounts received by the person. Employers were 
identified by ONYF and their annual financial data were provided by NAV. The data was 
transformed to a fixed format monthly panel data set by the Databank of the Institute of 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
Estimation sample: Workers employed with a labor contract at least once in a foreign or 
domestic private enterprise the maximum employment level of which exceeded the 10 workers 
limit at least once in 2003-2011. We removed workers and firms with less than two data points, 
zero wages and missing covariates. 98.5 percent of the workers belong to a single connected 
group.13 Special subsamples have been selected for the study of new firms and spillovers. 
Data access. Data for the estimation sample and Stata dofiles are available on request. The 
original data set called Admin2 is available via remote access to the Databank’s servers. Write to 
adatkeres@krtk.mta.hu for requesting access to the data. Note that the size of the original data set 
ranges between 60 and 120 Gbytes, depending on the amount of information stored in special 
modules that you want to merge to the base file. The files are in Stata16 format. R and Python 
codes are allowed. 
 
                                                          
13‘When a group of persons and firms is connected, the group contains all the workers who ever worked for any of the 
firms in the group and all the firms at which any of the workers were ever employed. In contrast, when a group of 
persons and firms is not connected to a second group, no firm in the first group has ever employed a person in the 
second group, nor has any person in the first group ever been employed by a firm in the second group. From an economic 
perspective, connected groups of workers and firms show the realized mobility network in the economy. From a 
statistical perspective, connected groups of workers and firms block-diagonalize the normal equations and permit the 




Wage. The daily wage figure used in the paper was calculated as monthly earnings divided by the 
number of days covered by pension insurance (‘working days’ henceforth) in the given month. 
Multiple payments made by the same employer to the same person within a month were summed 
up. Working days belonging to these payments were also summed up but capped at 30 or 31 days. 
In the case of multiple job holders the wage figure belongs to the highest paying job. We 
normalized the wage figures by dividing them with the national average wage in the given month, 
as measured in the starting sample. Source: ONYF.  
Foreign-owned firm, MNE: dummy variable set to 1 for firms majority owned by one or more 
foreign owners. Ownership shares are measured as fractions of subscribed capital. Source: NAV 
Person controls 
Gender, age: Source: ONYF 
Skill levels. Skill levels are inferred from the ‘highest’ occupational status held by the person in 
2003-2011. The classification is basedon one-digit occupational codes:  1 Top managers, 2 Other 
managers, 3 Professionals,  4 Other white collars, 5 Skilled blue collars, 6 Assemblers and machine 
operators, 7 Elementary occupations. Persons employed in occupations 1-3 at least once are 
classified as high skilled. Persons never employed outside occupations 6 and 7 are classified as 
low skilled. Other persons are classified as medium skilled. Source: ONYF 
Total time spent non-employed. The number of months out of employment in 2003-2011. 
Source: ONYF 
Disability payment: dummy variable, with 1 standing for any kind of transfer (pension or 
allowance) received on the basis of permanent disability (rokkantnyugdíj, rokkantsági járadék). 
Monthly data. Source: ONYF. 
Care allowance: dummy variable, with 1 standing for any kind of benefit received by the 
observed person on the basis of raising children (tgyás, gyed, gyes, gyet) or taking care of disabled 
relatives (ápolási segély). Monthly data. Source: OEP, ONYF. 
Health expenditures. Expenditures and costs registered by the National Health Insurance Fund 
(OEP). The items include total amount paid for OEP-supported medicine and the costs of OEP-
supported services/treatment provided by district doctors, specialists and hospitals. We 
normalized the nominal figures by dividing them with the national average wage in the given 
month, as measured in the starting sample. Annual data. Source: OEP 
Job controls 
Tenure. Months elapsed since entry to the firm. Set to zero in the case of left-censored 
employment spells. A dummy stands for observations from left-censored spells. 
Spell lasting for one day. Hungarian firms often pay to individual subcontractors by formally 
employing them on the day of payment. This practice results in exorbitant ‘daily wages’ in some 
cases. 
Occupation. One digit ISCO codes. 
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Regional unemployment rate: seasonally adjusted ILO-OECD unemployment rate in the given 
month and NUTS-2 region. The worker’s region is identified on the basis of his/her zip code in 
2003. Source: author’s calculation using the Labor Force Survey. 
Firm controls 
Firm size: average number of employees. Annual data. Source: NAV.  
Capital-labor ratio: net value of fixed assets per worker. Annual data. Source: NAV 
Exporter: non-zero exports revenues. Annual data. Source: NAV.  
Sector: NACE 2. Source: NAV 
 
